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Conrad 1

Videogame Play and the Ethics of Imagining
Many are interested in exploring whether playing certain videogames can be right or wrong,
good or bad in a moral sense. Plenty of philosophers have taken some utilitarian or virtue-ethical
stance on the matter, arguing from the consequences of playing potentially objectionable
videogames toward conclusions about when playing such videogames is permissible,
praiseworthy or — more frequently — blameworthy. Commonly, their arguments depend in
some way or another on whether playing violent or otherwise objectionable videogames impacts
one’s moral character, players’ disposition to act immorally in other regards and so forth.1
Michael Goerger (2017) calls this the contamination thesis, according to which playing violent
or otherwise objectionable videogames has a “direct and pernicious impact on real life behavior”
(3).
The view is difficult to square with the available empirical research. It’s not clear, for
instance, that the measures of aggression used in psychological studies on players’ behaviors can
usefully indicate tendencies toward violence or other immoral behavior; further, aggressive
tendencies observed under laboratory conditions aren’t always mirrored in observed real-life
scenarios (4). Besides the issues that these consequence-based approaches face, I think there’s
more to be said on the matter. Empirical considerations don’t exhaust all that’s at stake in the
ethics of videogame play. I explore another avenue for the moral evaluation of videogame play,
best illustrated through example.
Imagine Ethical Ellie, a morally upstanding person who sits down to play Grand Theft Auto
V (2013) in private every now and then after returning home from work. Ellie has saved the
game at a particular point in the narrative, one in which she controls the character of Trevor, a
1

McCormick 2001, Waddington 2007, Coeckelbergh 2007 and Wonderly 2008 offer such views.
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psychopathic criminal, as he tortures a kidnapped man in order to extract information from him.
His victim is willing to talk from the get-go, but Trevor tortures him anyway, and players control
him as he does so. The scene’s satirical intentions are lost on Ellie, who just likes to play the
scene. She chooses from the instruments of torture offered to her and takes delight in the realistic
representation of gruesome, unnecessary violence, particularly enjoying the degree of control she
has over the scene. At its conclusion, Ellie powers down the videogame before her save-state is
overwritten so that she can play her favorite part of Grand Theft Auto V another day.
If you find this sort of behavior unsettling, you’re in good company. Many share a pretheoretical intuition that enjoying this sort of gameplay is wrong. But it’s not immediately
obvious why. If we asked Ellie about it, she might reply, “It’s only a game! I’m just having fun.”
She’s right: Trevor and the tortured man are merely fictional characters, so she isn’t harming
anyone else. It’s not as if Ellie is playing with the aim to convince anyone that torture is
enjoyable or permissible; she plays privately and doesn’t encourage anyone else to do the same.
Perhaps she’s worried of what others would think, especially considering that she’s an otherwise
upstanding person. Ellie’s only morally ambiguous behavior manifests in her penchant for this
videogame’s torture scene. And while an actual person might have grounds to object to
representations of themselves as tortured or torturing, Trevor and his victim do not exist, nor are
they depictions of any real person. There is no one to so object.
Despite all of this, Ellie seems to be doing something wrong — but it’s not because her
gameplay will make her act wrongly in the future, nor is it because she is encouraging others to
do wrong or because she is delighting in an objectionable depiction of a real person. It may well
be that certain videogame play can leave a mark on players’ moral character, but here it seems
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that there’s something wrong about enjoying torture gameplay in itself, besides considerations of
consequences or others’ wishes.
I think this and similar cases of videogame play can be explained as wrong in terms of this
feature of videogames: They are works of fiction, works of a kind intended to prompt
imaginative activities, and playing videogames involves undergoing imaginings, typically for
fun. I say that we are morally responsible for the imaginings that we choose to undergo and that
we enjoy; it is my view that is wrong to enjoy imaginings when such enjoyment expresses
attitudes, beliefs or values (hereafter simply ‘attitudes’) that we ought not hold. Once we’ve
shown this, we’ll be able to see how Ellie’s enjoyment of this segment of Grand Theft Auto V
expresses attitudes she shouldn’t have, e.g. delight toward political torture.
I begin with a short discussion of imagination and fiction before returning to the case I’ve
just presented. I compare it to thought experiments offered by Aaron Smuts (2013) and Berys
Gaut (1998), each of whom presents arguments intended to demonstrate the intrinsic wrongness
of enjoying imagining evil. Brandon Cooke’s (2014) criticisms help us see where we can
improve their accounts. With help from Stephanie Patridge’s (2011) account of incorrigible
social meaning, which describes how certain representations can carry connotations regardless of
the intentions of their authors and audiences, I argue that when we imagine something as an
instance of a kind, our imaginings can tell us what we think about all instances of that kind. Our
imaginings can thereby express attitudes we hold toward real things; we are responsible for these
attitudes, so when our imaginings express attitudes we shouldn’t possess, we can appropriately
be judged for possessing those attitudes. I conclude with a review of the limitations of my
arguments and with suggestions for future research.

Conrad 4
Imagining and fictions
It will suffice to make general remarks about imagining. My view doesn’t rely on the details
of any particular theory of imagining, and the considerations I raise should be translatable in
terms of the theories available. To imagine is to entertain some proposition, experience or thing
in your mind without committing, one way or the other, to the existence or truth of the
proposition, experience or thing imagined. I might consider whether I had left the stove on this
morning, or think of my ideal living situation, or wonder what it’s like to be a famous movie star.
These are intentional imaginings.
Not all imaginings are intentional actions. A catchy tune might come to me unbidden, and
might even annoy me if I find myself unable to get it out of my head. Or I may drift into a
daydream by accident. Plausibly, the dreams we have while sleeping comprise unintentional
imaginings. This distinction is useful because we don’t typically hold people responsible for
things that happen to them or things that don’t involve their approval or choice. Accidental
imaginings aren’t the proper objects of ethical evaluation. But if I sit down to deliberately
daydream, I’m initiating and guiding myself through a series of imaginings. If any of our
imaginings can be evaluated ethically, the imaginings that we choose to undergo can.
Imagining is a common experience. We imagine when we daydream; we imagine when we
consider thought experiments; we imagine when we read a book or watch a movie. Broadly
speaking, we imagine when we engage with any kind of fiction. Kendall Walton (1990) says that
any time we engage with a fiction, we are playing a game of make-believe with it. On his view,
works of fiction are ‘props’ for helping us imagine fictional worlds, the same way that toy cars,
figurines and the like are props for children’s games of make-believe (Walton 51). When we
listen to a joke, read a book, or listen to and watch a film, the sentences, sounds and visual
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phenomena of the work guide us through the fiction; we make-believe as if the sentences were
true or as if what we are hearing and seeing were really happening. Sophisticated props, e.g.
novels and videogames, help us deliberately undergo imaginings. (Daydreams, on the other hand,
are propless fictions.)
Ethical concerns regarding the authorship of fictions overlap with those concerning our
engagement with fictions. Authors are responsible for their intentions and motivations for
creating fictional works. It seems wrong to make propagandistic fictions for the purpose of
spreading misinformation, for instance, or to fictionally represent a real person in a way intended
to unjustly besmirch their reputation. I’ll bracket these sorts of issues and restrict my focus to
what audiences, not authors, do when they engage with fictions.
With these minimal remarks on fictions and imaginings in mind, let’s consider what some
authors have suggested regarding the ethics of imagining.

Wrongful imaginings
Recall the case of Ethical Ellie, whose epithet seems inaccurate in light of her fondness for
Grand Theft Auto V’s torture gameplay. Again, we have ruled out appeals to consequences and
other relevant concerns. What seems to be wrong is just the fact that she enjoys imagining
torture.
Some may immediately object to the idea that imaginings can ever be wrong. An opponent
might say, “We know the difference between our imaginings and reality. Few get confused by
the distinction! Ellie knows full well that the objects of her imaginings aren’t people. No harm,
no foul.” Is it ever wrong, in itself, to undergo an imagining?
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Aaron Smuts (2013) presents a thought experiment intended to convince us that it is bad, in
itself, to enjoy imagining evil things. He has us consider a barren world that contains a lone
person who is imagining pleasant thoughts about cats; consider a world that is similarly deserted,
save for a survivor who spends his time imagining himself committing violence to children —
children that did not, do not and will not exist (124–125). By way of moral intuition, Smuts says
that the second world is worse in a moral sense, not because the person might harm anyone as a
result or because the fantasies might incline him to harm others, but because the imaginings are
evil in themselves. It’s just bad to fantasize evil, says Smuts (126).
Smuts might be right, but his argument doesn’t get him there. In relying solely on moral
intuition, Smuts begs the question, insisting on its self-evident truth. But his conclusion isn’t
self-evident; competing accounts are on the table. An act-utilitarian would disagree, opting
instead not to prefer one world over another so long as the fantasists derive equal amounts of
pleasure from their imaginings. A non-moral explanation could explain the gut intuition, too:
Perhaps I simply like cat fantasies, so I prefer the world in which cats are imagined. Maybe it’s a
mistake to confuse this aesthetic preference for a basic moral intuition. We should supply more
persuasive reasons for taking a stance on this kind of case.
Berys Gaut (1998) offers another, similar argument. He says that we could imagine a man,
imprisoned in solitary confinement for the rest of his years, who spends his time fantasizing
about himself raping women — not women he has ever met, just imagined women. Gaut says
that we can judge this man’s imaginings to be morally reprehensible, not because he might
realize his fantasies, but “for what and how he imagines, independently of how he acts or may
act” (187).
When the rape fantasist imagines his fictional women, he is imagining them as women, that is, as
beings of a kind that also has instances in the real world; and that he imagines them as women is,
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of course, essential to his imaginative project. Thus, by virtue of adopting such an attitude toward
his imagined women, he implicitly adopts that attitude toward their real-life counterparts — and so
reveals something of his attitude toward real-life women. (Gaut 187–188)

Let’s adjust the example to involve a man who imagines himself abusing children, and that his
imagining them as children, a category that has instances in the real world, is essential to his
imaginative project. This man is just like Smuts’ imagined child torture fantasist: He enjoys
directing himself through imaginings that involve him hurting kids in particular.
Unlike Smuts, Gaut offers a reason to believe that what this man imagines and how he
responds to those imaginings — say, whether he enjoys them — is wrong. For Gaut, the
imaginings about children that this man enjoys undergoing reveal what he thinks about actual
children, not just the children in his mental life. On his view, the fantasist’s pleasure in
imagining harming children reveals an implicit approval of attitudes toward actual children, e.g.
an attitude of delight toward their harm, or of approval toward child abuse, or of disregard
toward human suffering. These are attitudes of which nobody should approve; it is morally
wrong to do so.
It’s worth noting that in interpreting Gaut, I’ve emphasized the prisoner’s enjoyment of
imagining himself committing evil. I think that the most charitable interpretation of Gaut would
have him say that one can’t enjoy such an imagining without having the corresponding bad
attitude. This is distinct from saying that one can’t, or wouldn’t, imagine some evil without
having an associated bad attitude, belief or value. If that were true, it would be impermissible to
entertain imaginings of evil tout court, e.g. contemplating immoral states of affairs and thinking
of what it would be like for someone to do wrong. I think few would find this view plausible; it
imperils the enterprise of moral philosophy, for one. So let’s say that, for Gaut, enjoying the
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imagining is wrong because it reveals that the imaginer implicitly approves of an attitude that is
wrong to approve of.
I agree with Gaut on this. One of the immoral things that the prisoner is doing is enjoying
these imaginings because his enjoying them expresses his approval of objectionable attitudes
regarding children and violence. (In the next section, I will say more about how our imaginings
can express attitudes toward the actual counterparts of the objects of our imaginings; for now,
let’s grant the point.) But say that the prisoner feels guilty for enjoying these imaginings, perhaps
because he knows that it would be wrong to approve of violence toward actual children.2 Would
this indicate that the prisoner doesn’t approve of the attitudes expressed in his imaginings, say,
violence toward children? Do we need to look for a different source of wrongness in his actions?
No, I don’t think so. At best, the guilt indicates that he doesn’t wholeheartedly approve of the
enjoyment that he derives from his abuse fantasies. They don’t repulse him to the point that he
stops partaking in them, after all. Approving, in any degree, of an attitude of which nobody
should approve is wrong; even if you don’t like that you approve of such attitudes, it’s wrong to
do so. The child abuse fantasist approves of the attitudes of actual child abusers, attitudes that
take actual children as their objects.
You might think all of this is on the wrong track, though, if you believe that our attitudes
about the objects of our imaginings can’t express what we think of those things’ actual
counterparts. In a reply to Gaut’s view, Brandon Cooke (2014) makes this claim. He says that
adopting an attitude toward the objects of our imaginings is not an implicit adoption of the same
attitude toward the real-world instances of those objects; when our attitudes toward fictional
2

One can entertain an attitude without having an attitude of approval toward it. In fact, it is
common to entertain an attitude that one disapproves of. The claim that possessing an attitude
requires an attitude of approval toward that attitude would imply an infinite regress. If you
possessed an attitude of approval toward that attitude, you’d need an attitude of approval toward
that attitude of approval, ad infinitum.

Conrad 9
entities do reflect our attitudes toward real ones, he says, it is only because the author intended
that those representations refer to real entities:
Shifting our focus to artworks, it is true that some works prompt certain attitudes within fictive
imaginings and also encourage similar attitudes toward the real-world counterparts of those
imaginings. But this is not always the case. Recall that generating a fictive utterance involves the
intention that the audience disengage the standard [epistemic] speech act commitments, so in the
default case, such an utterance does not refer to real-world entities. Many fictions do, of course,
also make reference to things in the world (for example, a satire with animal characters that an
informed audience would recognize as also commenting on contemporary politicians; a fairy tale
intended also to serve as racist propaganda). But this feature of a fiction is dependent on distinct
intentions of the fiction’s author and not on the utterance tout court, since fictions do not make
reference to the world merely by prescribing fictive imaginings. Determining whether a fiction
works in such a multilayered way is a matter of making inferences about the author’s intentions. In
cases such as fantasy, the author and audience are typically the same person, but the foregoing
remarks still apply. From the mere fact that a person fantasizes about x, we cannot conclude that
the person actually desires x or approves of it. Working that out requires us to know other facts
about the person’s mental life. (Cooke 320–321)

Because imagining entails so few commitments toward the veracity of the objects of our
imaginings, Cooke says, imagining reveals little about our thoughts about the things we’re
imagining. In a sense, he has to be right; nobody has opinions that are truth-apt, in the ordinary
sense of being true or false by virtue of how the world is, about merely fictional things.
At the same time, I’m not sure that this is the most responsive rebuttal to Gaut’s argument.
Gaut is saying that holding a bad attitude is constitutive to enjoying imaginings of evil. You can’t
enjoy the imagining without possessing the attitude you ought not hold; the latter is necessary for
the former. And Gaut says that imaginings are wrong when they depend on, and thereby express,
the endorsement of wrongful attitudes. Cooke says that imaginings themselves don’t
constitutively contain objectionable attitudes, but he says that they can cause them. For Cooke,
imaginings and their prompting are derivatively wrong when they encourage the adoption of
attitudes that no one should hold, because such encouragement is wrong in itself (323).
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Cooke is right to say that it’s wrong to encourage others to adopt immoral attitudes even if
you’re unsuccessful in so convincing them. But he can’t be right in saying that an imagining is
only wrong when it works to encourage others to adopt the wrong attitudes and beliefs. For one,
this can’t explain the intuition we’re trying to account for. In the case of Ethical Ellie, we think
she’s done wrong even though nothing about her actions encourage others to enjoy imagining
realistic depictions of torture.
For another, he too quickly rules out the possibility that the imaginings we enjoy undergoing
can express the attitudes we have toward the real instances of the kinds of things we imagine
about. So we should look to see how bad attitudes can manifest in our imaginings and how our
imaginings can express our attitudes toward the actual counterparts of what we imagine about.

Attitudes in imaginings
Let’s work backward from Cooke’s claim that imagining about fictions doesn’t involve
reference to real-world entities. I think Cooke is saying that because imaginings involve fictitious
entities, or fictional versions of real things, they do not display or express our attitudes toward
anything real. Our imaginings, he says, are only ‘about’ the fictitious entities that are the objects
of our imaginings.
I don’t think this is how imaginative reference works. Even if an imaginer does not intend for
their imaginings to correspond to any real-world counterpart, they still express the imaginer’s
attitudes and beliefs about the sort of thing they’re imagining — and because they’re about that
sort of thing, they express what we think of the real instances of that kind of thing. When we
imagine something as an instance of some kind, our reactions to those imaginings do express our
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attitudes about that kind and its instances, because we are imagining about that kind of thing in
particular.
For instance, when I imagine a baseball bat, it appears to my mind’s eye as a long, largely
cylindrical piece of wood or metal that is meant to hit baseballs. When I imagine about a game of
baseball, baseball bats appear this way and are used to that end. Because I intend to depict a
baseball bat in my imaginings involving them, those imaginings reveal my beliefs about what
baseball bats are.
Consider Bill, who knows little about baseball and baseball bats, but does know the function
of baseball bats in the game, namely that they’re used to hit baseballs. Let’s say that in Bill’s
imaginings about baseball, players swing small, winged creatures at baseballs. When his
imaginings feature baseball, he does intend to imagine baseball bats, and those imaginings reveal
his conception of what baseball bats are: small, winged creatures that are used to hit baseballs,
poor things.
Crucially, these imaginings aren’t about any particular baseball bat, but they are about the
kind of thing that baseball bats are. They show what Bill thinks about any baseball bat. And his
imaginings show the position he takes on the properties of actual instances of baseball bats, too.
If we asked Bill to pick out a baseball bat, then stood him in front of a long, largely cylindrical
piece of wood and a small, winged creature, he’d point to the latter. When we imagine something
as an instance of a kind, those imaginings are sensitive to our conception of that kind — of what
we think its instances are like in general, including how they are to be treated or interacted with.
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(Clearly Bill has an incorrect conception of baseball bats. What matters, I think, is that he
intends to conceive of a baseball bat when he describes what he thinks a baseball bat is, includes
them in his imaginings, or tries to point to one in real life.3)
In the modified version of Gaut’s case, the prisoner takes pleasure in imagining the torture of
children, and it’s central to his imaginative project that he is imagining his victims as children.
This doesn’t reveal his attitudes toward any particular, actual child, but it shows what he thinks
of children in general — specifically, that any child is an instance of a kind that has no right to
physical well-being, say, or whose rights are superseded by the prisoner’s sadistic desires, or that
can permissibly be harmed. The prisoner doesn’t need to tell us his opinions about children for
us to know that his attitudes about children are immoral. Armed with a description of his
preferred daydreams, we know that he holds attitudes that he shouldn’t. The same goes for Ellie
and her penchant for imagined political torture.
Gaut’s prisoner might deny that he’s imagining children as we know them in the world. He
could object, saying that he’s not intending to depict children in his imaginings; rather he harms
children-prime, a fictitious variant on children, in his imaginings. “Heavens, no! I’m not
imagining children, or they’re not really children. The objects of my imaginings are things of the
sort that have neither experiences nor rights to be deprived of. They only act as if they’re in pain
and all, and that’s what I like to see in my mind’s eye. Torturing children? Reprehensible!” It
may be wrong to hold certain attitudes toward children, but maybe not toward children-prime.
Does the prisoner’s move work? I think his line of reasoning seems weaselly, not persuasive.
Here’s why: Our conceptions of things aren’t constructed alone, in a vacuum. To a significant
3

Plausibly, you need to have enough of the correct concept in order for your imagining to be
about the thing in the world; if you’re too wrong about what a baseball bat is, then perhaps
you’re really imagining something else. Let’s say that knowing the function of baseball bats
suffices.
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degree, at least some of them are socially constructed, constrained by the reality of our social
contexts. So the range of possible interpretations of certain representations — even
representations we present only to ourselves, as in our daydreams — is limited by the meanings
that ‘stick’ to those representations.
Stephanie Patridge (2011) details one way that this can happen: Some representations have
“an incorrigible social meaning that raises the moral stakes and opens the door to associated
character assessments” (307). Though our imagined representations are epistemically flexible —
they might involve a real person that we know acting contrary to how we know they would, for
instance — they aren’t epistemically open, or altogether untethered from reality. Social facts
constrain the range of possible interpretations that anyone properly familiar with the concepts
could glean from the representation.
Patridge takes the example of a political cartoon that depicts Barack Obama eating a
watermelon. Such a representation of Obama carries racist implications for (at least) U.S.
audiences due to the nation’s history of racism, slavery, and the association of such imagery with
the dehumanization of black Americans. Anyone familiar with the relevant facts about
contemporary American culture and U.S. history cannot deny the cartoon’s racist connotations.4
Someone might be scolded for enjoying a representation like this and then reply, “But it’s only a
cartoon.” The reply misses the point; appeals to the representation’s status as fictional fail to
recognize the incorrigible social meaning of the imagery. Patridge says that it is a failure of
character to be insensitive to this failure to see its social meaning as incorrigible:

4

Patridge does recognize the epistemic flexibility of even this kind of representation, though:
“Just about any successful alteration of the meaning of Obama eating watermelon in the United
States will be one that uses this kind of racist trope to make a distinctly anti-racist message”
(308). All we need is this: Any interpretation of this imagery is conditioned by its racist baggage.
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Such a failure is a failure of both sensitivity and of sympathy—sensitivity to the social meaning of
the imagery, and sympathy with those who are the targets of such imagery. Sympathy requires us
to inhabit the perspective of others, and to fail to see these representations as targeting others is to
fail to adequately exhibit a properly sympathetic response in relation to a feature of current life
that especially calls for sympathy; in this case, oppression. … To insist that one’s imagination is
one’s own private affair, detached from one’s own actual commitments and similarly detached
from the contextual moral facts on the ground, amounts minimally, in this case, to a thumbing of
one’s nose at a requirement of solidarity with the victims of oppression. This is an obvious vice of
character. … Such a lack of sensitivity might be a failure to see the relationship between the
game’s representation of members of an oppressed class and the actual oppression of such
individuals, or it might be a failure to see such a connection as a reason to avoid enjoying such a
representation.” (Patridge 310)

Note that Patridge is not saying that it would be an expression of racist attitudes to enjoy the
representation of Obama eating watermelon. She is only arguing that the failure to see the
representation’s social meaning as incorrigible is a moral failing in itself.
But I think Patridge’s account here can help combat appeals like the prisoner’s claim to be
expressing attitudes about children-prime, not children. His imaginings involve an incorrigible
link between the depictions of violence against children — or even children-like representations
— and the reality of child abuse. Anyone aware of the relevant social facts would agree that
these imaginings bring the usual connotations with them: The prisoner can’t imagine himself
committing violence against ‘children-prime’ without those imaginings involving tacit attitudes
of approval toward, for instance, child abuse. The imagined situation is loaded with social
meaning that cannot be waved away with appeals to the situation’s fictitiousness.
Gaut’s prisoner and Ethical Ellie are guilty of the same kind of wrongs. Gaut’s prisoner
delights in his imaginings, which cannot be divorced from the real evils they recall and to which
they refer, so they express his possession of attitudes nobody should hold. Our intuition
regarding Ellie’s behavior can be explained this way, too. Political torture is a grim reality. Her
enjoying Grand Theft Auto V’s depiction of it for pleasure’s sake is disconcerting because that’s
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not the right attitude someone ought to have toward the subject. In both cases, the imaginer ought
to know better; they should recognize the incorrigible social meaning of the representations that
they’re enjoying. The attitudes expressed in those imaginings and engagements with fictions are
attitudes that nobody ought to have.

Concluding remarks and the limits of my argument
This meditation on the ethics of imagining offered insights on the ethics of enjoying fictions
in general; videogames, like other works of fiction, are essentially sophisticated props for games
of make-believe, like those games we play with books, daydreams, films, jokes, and theatrical
productions. The pertinent question is: When is it right or wrong to engage in certain
imaginings? I have argued that it is wrong when our enjoyment expresses attitudes, beliefs or
values that we shouldn’t hold. Before resting my case, I should review the limits of my
arguments.
First, as far as videogames are concerned, the foregoing arguments apply only to those cases
involving single-player videogames that are fictions; I have excluded cases involving multiplayer
gameplay or nonfiction videogames.5 It seems fairly uncontroversial to say that we can wrong
one another in the course of playing videogames with other people, e.g. through poor sporting
etiquette, and that we can do actual wrong to others via virtual means. I also excluded
considerations of nonfictional videogames, or videogames that aspire to accurately portray realworld events or figures; it seems plausible that such nonfiction works involve special obligations
5

Nonfictional videogames might be biographical, documentary or educational, or they might
otherwise purport to accurately describe reality. For instance, That Dragon, Cancer is an
autobiographical videogame created by Ryan and Amy Green, who lost their son to terminal
cancer at the age of four years; the videogame memorializes him and shares their tale of hardship
and perseverance with players. Engagement with this sort of game will involve different, morally
relevant considerations than do the typical cases of videogame play.

Conrad 16
and responsibilities regarding how authors depict their subjects and how audiences are to engage
with these works, but these matters are ultimately outside the scope of this paper. Besides,
videogames are typically works of fiction, so I take the paradigmatic case of potentially
problematic videogame play to involve merely fictional characters and events. Our conclusions
about ‘videogames’ should be taken to be conclusions about playing single-player videogames
that are works of fiction.
Further, there is one sort of case that worries me about my conclusion. Our intuition about
cases like Gaut’s and Ellie’s might clash with another common case. People commonly watch
TV shows, for instance Breaking Bad or Game of Thrones, that feature depictions of horrific
things, even actions and events with incorrigible social meanings: murder, rape, suicide and
more. Usually we watch these shows for pleasure, because we enjoy them, and this seems
benign. If this counts as enjoying imagining the wrong sort of thing, though, then this seems to
serve as a strong counterexample to the intuition that motivates my view. Maybe the mere fact
that you’re enjoying the fictional portrayal of something is not enough to show that you possess a
bad attitude you shouldn’t be holding.
An admission of guilt: I began by using cases of daydreaming and videogame play because
they involve imaginings about oneself and therefore are easier to establish as wrongful than are
cases that involve imaginings about others, like those audiences undergo when watching
Breaking Bad.6 When I watch Breaking Bad, I don’t imagine myself as the criminal protagonists,
Walter White or Jesse Pinkman, who betray others, kill, manufacture drugs, steal and so forth.
6

Robson and Meskin (2016) argue that videogames are self-involving interactive fictions,
“fictions that, in virtue of their interactive nature, are about those who consume them” (165).
Take, for instance, to the language players use when talking about videogame play: First- and
second-person statements like “I dodged the attack” or “You shot the enemy” are common and
reflect the way players engage with these works, i.e. how we imagine ourselves, in some sense,
as doing what we make our on-screen avatar does.
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To watch Breaking Bad is to imagine that those fictional characters, not myself, are doing those
things; if I were imagining them of myself, I wouldn’t be watching Breaking Bad, but using it as
a prop in some other Waltonian game of make-believe.
As Cooke points out, it’s wrong to enjoy these kinds of representations when doing so acts to
encourage acting out or approving of such behaviors in either oneself or others. It’s wrong to
enjoy racist jokes, for instance, because they are meant to elicit enjoyment in the adoption or
recognition of racist attitudes and beliefs. If a film ultimately, if subtly, endorsed racism, then
it’d be wrong to set out to watch the film for purposes of enjoyment. Additionally, there may be
a case for establishing that obsessive or neurotic fascination with even well-intentioned stories,
stories that nonetheless involve depictions of (say) rape or torture, can exhibit attitudes that one
should not hold. But making that case is not my goal here.
I end with this: Enjoying representations in fictions about others’ misdeeds is a distinct
activity from enjoying fantasies about oneself doing so. Whether there’s a morally significant
distinction, however, is a question I leave open. It does seem as if imagining others’ terrible
actions does not involve our taking a position on those things, or as if our own imagined actions
more easily reflect our beliefs about the real-life counterparts of the objects of our imaginings.
But what makes the difference between enjoying a torture scene in Game of Thrones and Ellie’s
enjoyment of the torture scene in Grand Theft Auto V? The answer will help to clarify the
relationship between our enjoyment of imaginings and the attitudes we hold toward the contents
of our imaginings.
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